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NOTE REGARDING STUDIES OF NEAR MIDAIR COLLISIONS 
In response to  requests  from  the FAA and various other  organizations in the aviation commun- 
ity,  the  ASRS  staff is conducting several studies  of  reports  of.near  midair collisions. The first such 
studies  had  been  planned  for  inclusion  in  this  Tenth  Quarterly  Report, but  i t  has  not  been possible 
to  complete detailed review of the manuscripts in time to include them. The editors regret any 
inconvenience  this  may  cause our readers. 
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NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING  SYSTEM:  TENTH QUARTERLY REPORT 
Ames Research Center 
and 
Aviation  Safety  Reporting  System  Office* 
SUMMARY 
This  tenth  report  contains  another  in  a series of  studies  of  human  factors  in air  carrier  opera- 
tions - Knowledge  of  Limitations  of the ATC System  in  Conflict  Avoidance  Capabilities.  The  study 
addresses some  of  those  assumptions  and  expectations held by  airmen regarding the capabilities  of 
the  system.  Limitations  related to  communication  are described  and problems associated with visual 
approaches,  airspace  configurations,  and  airport  layouts  are  discussed. 
The first section of this quarterly report presents a number of pilot and controller reports 
illustrative of three typical problem types: occurrences involving pilots who have limited experi- 
ence;  reports  describing in-flight calls for  assistance;  and  flights in which  pilots  have  declined to  use 
available radar services. The final section  includes  examples  of  Alert  Bulletins  and  the  FAA 
responses to  them. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is the tenth in a series of reports describing operations of the NASA Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) (refs. 1-9) under a Memorandum of Agreement between the National 
Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration  and  the  Federal  Aviation  Administration. 
The first  section  contains  reports  illustrative of three  separate  problem categories. The  second 
section is a research study of limitations of the ATC system and how they affect the conflict 
avoidance capabilities of the system. Finally, the report contains a selection of Alert Bulletins, 
issued by  ASRS,  and  responses to  them. 
AVIATION  SAFETY  REPORTS 
Introduction 
ASRS Quarterly  Reports  customarily  include  a  section  devoted to  narratives  of  safety-related 
incidents illustrative of typical problem categories. In this Quarterly Report samples are given 
covering three types of occurrences: Incidents that involve pilots who have limited experience, 
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incidents in which  pilots in distress call for  or  are  offered  assistance,  and  instances  in  which  pilots 
fail to take  advantage  of available radar service. 
Proficiency  of  General  Aviation  Pilots 
In  flying,  as  in  many  other  forms  of  human  endeavor,  training,  study,  and  practice  are  not in 
themselves  sufficient guarantees  of  competence.  Only  through  experience  in  actual  performance is 
true  proficiency achieved. Many reports  to  ASRS  from  low-time  pilots  testify to  the lack  of  experi- 
ence of the many variables encountered in the aviation environment; of these variables, weather 
conditions  appear  to  be  the  most  troublesome.  Inability  to  interpret  weather  information  correctly, 
or  to judge  accurately  the severity of weather  conditions  encountered,  often  leads to  inadvertent 
entry  into  instrument  flight  conditions,  to  course  diversions  that  result  in  position  uncertainty,  or, 
through distraction and tension, to  miscalculation of such factors as fuel and flight time. The 
reports that follow describe some occurrences in which, perhaps, greater experience might have 
saved the pilots  from  some  apprehensive  moments. 
Event  1.  I was doing  my  second  4-hour  solo X€ from  Melbourne  to Ocala to  
Lakeland to Melbourne. I stopped at Lakeland for some rest and to  check the 
weather. As I did my preflight, I computed the gallons needed to  fly back to Mel- 
bourne  and  the  situation was pretty  good.  I  had  one  fourth  on  each 25 gallon tank - 
enough to  get  back. As I  took  off,  my  ground speed was less than I expected  it  to 
be. About 10 minutes later I saw to  my  left an aircraft. I knew I had the right of 
way,  but I let him pass first  (that was my  first  error).  I  followed  him  thinking  that 
he was going to  Melbourne. Later, I started looking for  ground  reference  and used 
my VOR to get to the  station.  The  instruments  read 060" and  my  heading  1100,  but 
I didn't rely on the instruments (that was my second error). Time passed and I 
decided to  tune Patrick  approach  for  a  D.F.  steer.  I  had no  transponder  and  there 
was not  much  they could do.  Soon I saw the East  Coast,  and I recognized the  airport 
about 5 miles northeast. I got clearance and when I did my checklist, I saw the 
tanks - one  empty.  I  switched  tanks. (As I  took  off  from  Lakeland I forgot to  lean 
the  mixture.)  I never told  the  tower of my  situation. As I  came  on  final,  the  tower 
told  me to  go around.  The gauges read empty  and  the  engine was running  rough. As 
I  came in for  landing flare the  engine  stopped,  but  I  landed  safely. 
* * *  
Event 2. On  Friday I departed PBI and  stopped  at SAV for  fuel  and to  get  FSS 
weather  for  the  second leg to Tri-State.  I was informed  that  weather was not  VFR; I 
delayed at SAV until Saturday. FSS weather was VFR all the way to  Tri-State. I 
filed VFR  and  departed  SAV.  North  of  the Blue Ridge Mountains  it  became  hazy, 
but I  had no  trouble seeing the  ground  at 8,500 ft. Abeam  Bluefield VOR it closed 
in under me at about 7,500 ft. I called Charleston Approach for position and was 
informed that I was 40 miles south of them. I informed them that I was strictly 
VFRqualified with approximately 2 hours fuel on board and that my destination 
was Tri-State.  They  informed  me  that  I  had  a  problem,  which  I  already  knew.  They 
handed  me  off to  Huntington  Approach  Control  and  they  in  turn  brought  me  into 
the  airport via radar. I at  no  time  stated  I was IFRqualified  nor  did  I  express  any 
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type  of  fear  stepping  down  through  the  clouds  from 7,000 to less than 1,000 ft. I 
had complete confidence in the Approach Control personnel and knew that they 
were  very confident in their  work. Also, I  had no  intention  of  violating  any  FARs  at 
any  time. I attribute  my calmness to the  fact  that I have many  hours  in  a  military 
aircraft  as  a  crewmember  and  you  might  say  that  I was accustomed to such  condi- 
tions.  After  my arrival at Tri-State  I was informed  that  the  preceding  day  there was 
unlimited  VFR. I personally  feel that  the briefers a t  SAV were not  totally  accurate 
in their forecasts. Added note: I am currently taking IFR instructions and should 
have my  IFR  ticket  in  the  near  future. 
* * *  
Event 3. I decided to make three takeoffs and full-stop landings to  maintain 
my  recent  night  experience.  I  had  noted  that  the  sky was bright  and  appeared to be 
VFR. I departed runway 18 and encountered a layer of fog or clouds at about 
400 ft, which restricted  ground  references.  At  this  point, I decided to  climb  and  con- 
tact Groton tower. They advised me to contact Quonset Approach Control. I had 
climbed to  1,500 ft  MSL and was in VFR-On-Top conditions. I stated to  Quonset 
that I wanted to go to an airport where I could land VFR. Another pilot radioed 
that New  Haven  was VFR  and  Quonset  came  back  with  a  clearance  to New Haven. 
I had no  charts  on  board,  and  they  then gave me  the VOR radials and frequencies 
necessary. I proceeded uneventfully until I had Griswold Airport in sight and I 
landed at Madison VFR, canceling my radar service with Westchester Approach  at 
that  time. 
* * *  
Event 4. I took off from OAK. On my preflight I checked the fuel (a little 
more  than  threequarters  of  a  tank,  about 19-20 gallons).  I went to San  Pablo Bay 
and  there I was doing  some  maneuvers  for  a  long  time.  Then I thought  to  come  back 
to  OAK,  but I went to  Antioch  Airport to  do some  touch-and-goes  without  thinking 
about my fuel;  then  I flew  near Concord VOR and  then I was coming  back to  OAK, 
but crossing over  Walnut  Creek (at 3,500 ft MSL) the engine  began to  stop. At  that 
moment I realized  I was out of  fuel. Before the engine stopped  completely I chose  a 
field to  land,  but  I  thought  to  try  to get to Buchanan  Airport. When I  steered to  the 
airport the engine and propeller were already stopped. At about 5 miles south of 
Buchanan Airport, I contacted the tower and asked for an emergency landing. At 
that  time  I was already aligned for  lR,  but I  had  still  enough  height to  get  to  19L  to 
land  with headwind. 
The  problem was that I only  thought  about  one  thing - flying  as  long  as  pos- 
sible  because  I am  working on  my commercial  course  and  I  have  very  few  hours of 
flight. I DIDN'T FORGET ABOUT MY FUEL - ONLY ABOUT MY FLIGHT 
TIME. 
* * *  
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Event 5. On a trip  from Denver to St.  Charles I .got too close to  the St.  Louis 
TCA. The  volume  of  traffic was light. I did  identify  myself to St.  Louis  Approach 
and  talked to the supervisor  after  the  incident. I was guilty . . . the supervisor was 
pleasant . . . I was  and  am  low-time; I have good  experience  in  the Chicago  TCA but 
was not familiar  with  St.  Louis. It was getting  dark. I have  figured out several ways 
to avoid such a problem  in  the  future.  The  advertised  hours  of  tower  operation  for 
St. Charles may have misled me some, although that is no excuse. I worked with 
Approach  Control  in Kansas City very satisfactorily, receiving traffic advisories that 
same day.  Perhaps a requirement to  work  in at least  one  other  TCA besides the  one 
closest to one's training would be valuable. I will not  get  into  another TCA without 
at least  cross-referencing on  two VORs so I know  exactly  where I am. 
Fuel-state awareness, misjudgment of weather, and inadvertent penetration of TCA are rela- 
tively common  examples  of  the  types  of  incidents  encountered  by  inexperienced  pilots.  The  two 
reports  that  follow are more  unusual  and  undoubtedly  provided  useful essons. 
Event 6. My wife, two passengers, and myself departed BTR for a pleasure 
night  flight to Lafayette. I was cleared by  Departure  Control to  LAF from  the BTR 
VOR at 2,000 ft. Conditions were 4 miles, smoke and haze at BTR, and 5 miles, 
smoke  and  haze  at  LAF.  En  route  over  the  swamp,  the  haze  got  thick so gradually 
that I lost sight of  the  stars  and  there were no  ground  lights in the  swamp.  The  only 
reference was the  lit highway that is a straight line between BTR and LAF, which 
became  an  optical  illusion  and  appeared to  come  from  the  right - across the wind- 
shield  and out  above  the  aircraft, convincing me  that I was in  a  right  bank  and div- 
ing. A check of the instruments indicated all was well and that I definitely had 
severe vertigo. A call to BTR Departure  got no  response, so we executed a 180" turn 
and my wife stayed on the radio. After an eternity we picked up BTR Departure 
calling another aircraft to  relay to us. I cut in and informed Departure that I was 
now receiving him.  Approach  told  me I was 25 miles out, gave me a  course  correc- 
tion,  and cleared me  for a  straight-in approach to  runway 4 at  Ryan  Airport. 
I believe that a notation  should  be  put  on  the  charts  that  IFR  conditions  may 
exist  over the  swamp even though  everybody  reports  VFR, especially at  lower  alti- 
tudes, and the low altitude didn't do much for radio reception either. The next 
fledgling pilot  who  encounters  the  swamp  at  lower  altitudes  may  not  be as fortunate 
as we, especially at  night. 
* * *  
Event 7 .  I advised tower that my position was 2 miles west of SCK VOR for 
landing. Prior to  my call, a commercial jet was heard on tower frequency advising 
position and was cleared for landing on runway 29R. After my radio call, tower 
asked if I  had  the  jet  in  sight; I reported  no.  Jet was then asked by  tower if he  had 
me  visually; jet reported yes. At this time tower requested my altitude and I 
reported  1,200  ft.  During  my  transmission I observed the  jet  entering a left base in 
my  two o'clock position  with  approximately 3/4 to  1 mile separation  at  an  altitude 
estimated by me to be 1,700 ft ,  descending. I then advised tower  that I would be 
making a 360" turn, which I immediately initiated. Upon rolling out of turn I 
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observed the  jet  on  final  approach  and  estimated  that I would be caught  by  wake 
turbulence  at  my  present  altitude. 
I then entered a climb, hoping to  get above the jet's altitude on base. After 
approximately  20  seconds  into  my  climb, I encountered severe buffeting followed 
by  what  felt  like a  severe  blow to the  top  of  my right wing,  causing the  aircraft to  
roll to  the right to approximately 70". I lowered  the  nose  of  my  aircraft  and  had to  
apply  full  opposite  aileron to  return to level flight. Fortunately I was  above  maneu- 
vering speed. Further approach to airport was uneventful and I advised tower of 
wake  turbulence  encounter.  Inspection  of  aircraft  after  landing revealed no damage 
to aircraft. 
The  pilot  in  the  report  above  recommended  that  pilot  education  stress  wake  turbulence  which, 
he feels, is a more powerful phenomenon than publications on the subject indicate. In fact he 
doubts  that  the  full  effect  of a  wake  encounter  can  be  appreciated  until it has  been  experienced. 
The last two  reports in this  group  exemplify  the classic case of the novice pilot geographically 
disoriented after encountering unexpected weather conditions. The first report came from a con- 
troller,  the  second  from a pilot. 
Event 8. Aircraft contacted Long Island Approach Control of 121.5 mHz. He 
was lost in IFR conditions and was a VFR-rated pilot. He  was radar-identified 
27 miles southeast of Long Island Airport, heading 160" over the Atlantic Ocean. 
His track was taking  him  farther out to  sea. All airports in the area  were IFR. He  was 
radar-vectored to  overhead the Peconic Airport, descended to 500 ft, and landed 
safely.  Peconic Airport was IFR  at  the  time of landing. I don't  know  how  the  pilot 
got  into  this  position,  but I believe it was accidental  and  that  he  learned his  lessons. 
Actions  that I took were  of an  emergency  nature. 
* * *  
Event 9. I called FSS for weather and to file VFR flight plan. According to 
information I received at  that  time, I could make Rockford and finish trip on fol- 
lowing day. After passing Angola, weather conditions became slightly worse and 
radio  reception was  garbled.  Somewhere  southwest  of  Lagrange I decided to  end  the 
day's  flying in Elkhart. When just west of Goshen,  weather  became  minimum  VFR 
or worse. Through  one  hole  in  the  clouds we  saw a row  of  airplanes;  assuming  this to  
be either Midway or Misawaka, I made a standard-rate 180" turn  in  an  attempt  to 
land at the field. Being unable to  make visual contact with the ground, I made 
another  standard-rate  turn  of 1 80", holding 3,500 ft  MSL and  290". I made  three 
broadcasts  in 3 minutes  on  121.5  before being  picked up  by Michiana Control  and 
guided in for a  landing on runway 9. The reasons for  uncertainty  about  location  in 
the Midway-Misawaka area was that  turbulence  left  me  little  time  for  dead  reckoning 
and the VOR  receiver was not making  a  sensible  indication,  probably  due to  
precipitation. 
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Calls for Help 
The  next  group  of  reports  concerns  the plight of  pilots  caught  in  weather  they were  unquali- 
fied to handle, or  who  for  other reasons  required the guidance of  ground  personnel  in  order to get 
their aircraft safely back to earth. The first two reports are from controllers; in those following, 
the pilots  tell  their  own tales. 
Event 1. Small aircraft called Departure, reporting at 7,900 ft  in IFR condi- 
tions.  Pilot was not  instrument-rated.  Aircraft was vectored  and  descended to  VFR 
conditions  south  of  Indy  and  pilot  proceeded  to SDF on his own  navigation. 
* * *  
Event 2. I was working  Approach  Control. I  received  a  call from a  very excited 
pilot claiming that  he was lost  and  low  on  fuel. He had  a  very  heavy  foreign  accent; 
for this reason it took  me  numerous  communications  to  identify  the  problem  and 
locate his position.  After  radar-identifying the  aircraft  and  checking  the  surrounding 
airports,  it was determined  that  Long Island MacArthur  Airport was the  best  bet. I 
vectored the aircraft to MacArthur  and  had  the  pilot  climb to  2,000  ft. Since  he was 
already  in the  clouds, I felt  that  altitude was his  best  friend,  considering  his  low  fuel 
status. He did finally make visual contact with the airport and landed without 
further  incident,  though  he  landed  on  runway 10, instead  of  runway 6, as instructed. 
He had  5  gallons  of  usable  fuel  remaining. 
* * *  
Event 3. As a flight instructor, I approved solo cross-country flight ’for a 
student  pilot,  after  careful  checks  of preflight actions  and  planning. Weather  along 
the route later caused student to become disoriented, although stations near the 
route were reporting no significant weather. Student encountered unforecast low 
visibility - then called for  help  on  12 1.5 mHz.  Aircraft was too low to receive radar 
or  radio  from ATC. Airline  flight  overhead  suggested  a  “heading” for  radar  contact 
and  student  followed  heading,  off his  planned  route,  and  became  lost  with  no  radar 
contact.  Student was eventually  located  and  landed  without  incident. 1. Unforecast 
weather, not apparent in FSS briefing. 2. Heading assignment took student off 
route, still with no radar surveillance. 
* * *  
Event 4 .  After a weather briefing from Harrisburg FSS and VFR conditions 
reported along route of flight, a departure was made from York, Pennsylvania to 
Stewart  Airport,  Newburgh, New York. However, at  the above-mentioned  location, 
an  unforecast  area  of  clouds was encountered.  Contact was made  with Poughkeepsie 
FSS and information requested with regard to the weather conditions at Stewart 
Airport.  Conditions were reported as  being 2,500 ft overcast and  12 miles  visibility. 
Since the destination airport was reporting VFR conditions and since operating 
under VFR conditions to the above-mentioned point, a decision was made to fly 
under what seemed to be a long but narrow area of clouds under an overcast of 
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approximately 3,000 f t  MSL.  While under this area of clouds at approximately 
800- ft  AGL, visibility conditions worsened  because of low-flying  clouds or ground 
fog.  Obviously,  a  dangerous  situation  had  developed  and to  assure terrain  and 
obstruction clearance, a climb was initiated. The aircraft entered into scattered 
clouds  which  evidently at  this  point  extended  up  to  the  overcast  and  upon leveling 
off  at 3,500 ft MSL, the aircraft was in IFR  conditions.  In view of this situation, 
Poughkeepsie FSS was contacted  and  a  position was established by use of  direction- 
finding  equipment.  After  ascertaining  the  full  extent of the  situation,  the  FSS  spe- 
cialist instructed  that 7700 be  squawked  and  Newark  Approach  be  contacted.  Radar 
assistance was requested from Newark Approach and, after ascertaining that the 
pilot was VFR-rated but  undertaking  training  toward  an  instrument  rating,  the  con- 
troller inquired if the  pilot  would  be able to  make  a VOR or  ILS  approach.  After 
giving some  consideration to this,  the  answer was in  the negative, as  he was an  instru- 
ment  student  and  not  proficient in instrument  approaches. By this  time  the  aircraft 
was out of  the  clouds  but  on  top  of  the  overcast.  The  controller  provided  an  initial 
heading  of 240°, which initially did not bring  about  improved  conditions.  Later,  a 
heading of approximately 190" was given, along with improving conditions and 
information  that Essex County  Airport was VFR  and  that  radar  vectors were  being 
provided to  this  airport.  Instructions were given to  inform  the  controller  of  the  alti- 
tude  when  descending  into  the overcast and when  having the  ground in sight. After 
breaking out  under  the overcast and in VFR  conditions,  instructions were given to 
contact Essex tower. Thereafter, a normal approach and landing was made under 
VFR  conditions.  After  landing,  with 45 minutes  of  fuel  remaining,  the  aircraft was 
refueled;  after  checking  weather,  a flight was made  under  VFR  conditions  to 
Stewart Airport. The factors that led to this occurrence are, I feel, encountering 
unforecast weather and a poor decision on the part of the pilot in command in 
attempting  to  proceed  to  the  destination  airport,  which was reporting VFR condi- 
tions,  by  trying  to  underfly  an area of  low  clouds. It would  seem  that  more  caution 
when  encountering  unforecast  weather  would  certainly  be in order  and,  along  with 
this,  greater  care in npt  penetrating areas  of  clouds  when not  instrument-rated  and 
operating  under  an  instrument flight plan. Of course,  the  best preventive to  such  a 
recurrence is continued  instrument  training  and  acquiring  an  instrument  rating.  This 
is something  I plan to  do in  the  near  future. 
* * *  
Event 5. I called the Burley  Flight Service weather:  clouds  at 2,000 ft, variable- 
little  wind,  no  forecast  for  destination - Hailey,  Idaho.  Took off from  Twin Falls 
Airport,  headed  for  Hailey.  Conditions: slight  breeze,  partially  cloudy,  slight  precipi- 
tation,  good visibility. Shortly  after  takeoff,  precipitation  ceased.  After  I  had flown 
approximately 25 miles (just past the  town  of.Shoshone),  there was a  dense  ground 
fog covering most  areas  except  mountains.  The  closer I got  to Hailey's Airport,  the 
more  cloud  cover  increased.  The  airport  and  town were  impossible to  locate  through 
the dense ground fog. I then forfeited any possibility of landing. I changed my 
course  back to Twin  Falls.  Cloud  cover  had  increased  dramatically  since my flight to 
Hailey  began; there were now  continuous  clouds.  I climbed to an  altitude  of 
10,000 ft to ensure that because of limited visibility I would not hit any of the 
mountains in the area, while also trying to clear the clouds. Unable to clear the 
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clouds, I was at this time flying strictly by instruments with no visible contact. I 
tuned  in on  the Twin Falls VOR and was flying  a  southern  heading.  I called Twin 
Falls tower  and  got  the  weather,  explaining  the  situation.  Twin Falls was completely 
clouded  in  and  they suggested  I contact Burley Airport. I contacted Burley Airport 
and,  through  their  help  and  the  Mountain  Home  Airport,  they  were.  able to deter- 
mine  my  location. Burley Control  guided  the  plane in by a  series of  magnetic  head- 
ings. Periodically checking our location by radio transmissions, they were able to  
guide the plane to  the  airport.  Through  broken visibility of  low  clouds,  I‘was  able 
to locate  runway 24 and land  safely in Burley.  Through the calm and precise efforts 
of all involved parties, especially the Burley  Flight  Service Station,  and  their  exact, 
confident  radio  contact,  a severe situation was efficiently  handled.  A  situation  such 
as the above described is very hard to  prevent with the factor of quick-changing 
weather.  However,  after the  situation  did  occur, every  possible procedure was taken 
to  ensure the flight’s safety. 
The  two  final  reports  in  this “Call for  Help” series do  not involve flight into  instrument  con- 
ditions; wind is the villain here,  confounding  the  pilots’ navigation and  making  necessary  the aid of 
ATC. In  the  second of these,  the  pilot was more  experienced - in  fact, was instrument  rated,  unlike 
the  others in the series - but was caught,  nevertheless,  and  obviously  learned  a  lesson. It is  interest- 
ing to  note  that in these “Call for  Help”  narratives,  the  effective aid of the ATC people is gratefully 
acknowledged  by the  reporters. 
Event 6. I called the Columbus FSS and requested winds and weather for a 
flight departing from Fairfield County Airport (Lancaster) to  Mansfield back to 
Fairfield County. He reported  that  winds were  very  light, and so I  assumed that  no 
wind correction angle  would be  required.  About 30 minutes  into  the  flight,  I passed 
the  Knox  County  Airport  and  made  corrections  that  I  thought  would  take  me  back 
on course.  Later,  not realizing I was off  course,  I saw a city and assumed that  this 
was Mansfield. My instructor  had  told  me  that  upon  reaching  the  limits  of  the  city  I 
should contact Mansfield radio. I did and that was when I realized that I was off 
course as I saw a runway which did not resemble Mansfield’s, from looking at my 
chart.  I figured this was Ashland County  and  turned  to  a  heading  of 240”. I  contin- 
ued this  course  and  passed  over  another  runway,  Shelby  County,  and  at  this  time 1 
called Mansfield radio, explained to  them my predicament, and requested a DF 
steer.  The  controller gave me  a  beautiful  DF  steer  which  got  me to  the  airport  safely. 
After refueling, I headed back to Fairfield County and encountered no problems. 
* * *  
Event 7. I was on  a  local  pleasure cruise from HNL-LIH-HNL to pick  up  some 
passengers and then return to HNL. VOR on airplane was not functional when I 
took off. I thereupon calculated the course to follow and left HNL for LIH (used 
the wind factor and calculated the course). No problems getting to  LIH. However, 
on  return  flight,  I  didn’t see  land  when my time  expired.  (I  allocated myself an  hour 
on the time.) Since visibility was 5 miles and the distance between Honolulu and 
Kauai is about 80 n.  mi.,  a small  off-course  difference  can  mean  a miss of  Honolulu. 
When the  time  expired,  I  climbed  up to  3,500 MSL and called the Honolulu  Flight 
Service Station.  They gave me  a DF steer  and  the  course  to  get  back  to  Honolulu. As 
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it turned out, I was 30 miles south of Honolulu. Obviously I had drifted farther 
south  than I thought.  After  FSS  switched  me  over to Honolulu  Approach  Control, 
they gave me the 30-mile figure from their radar. No problems after that. In the 
Honolulu to  Kauai  leg,  there  are  many  inherent  dangers  in  flying  the  course.  First,  I 
am very  qualified  as  a  pilot;  I  keep  myself  current on  instruments  (in Hawaii it’s very 
difficult) and fly 12-15 hours a month, several of them for training. Second, I am 
aware of  the MEAs between HNL and LIH. The MEAs should  be  placed  on the sec- 
tional as reference to the VFR pilot who could easily lose the VOR when flying 
en  route. It’s obviously  simple to  get  diverted  from  the islands just  by  a slight  wind 
shift that causes a 5-mile difference. Pilots ought to be cautioned on this. With 
respect to  my  navigation, I’m certain that I will not fly the HNL-LIH trip  without 
VOR,  due  to  the  obvious  dangers  that  can arise if I am off  course.  The  only possible 
alternative would be to  get radar vectors from Honolulu Center as a means to go 
en  route. 
Negative Stage I11 
The  third  set of narratives  in  this  Quarterly  Report  deals  with  flight  through  TRSA  airspace  by 
aircraft  not  participating in the available radar service. Timidity  on  the  part  of  inexperienced  pilots 
with respect to  their radio communication techniques and reluctance to  accept the possibility of 
delay as a  result  of  being given evasive vectors  are  among the reasons  why  some  pilots  refuse to take 
advantage of the  obvious  safety  factor  of full participation in Stage I11 service. Whatever the rea- 
sons,  such  pilots  increase  the  potential  conflict  hazard  for themselves and  for  other  aircraft in the 
area served by  the  terminal  radar  facility. 
The selected reports  that  follow  are  typical  of  those received by  ASRS;  such  reports  are  sub- 
mitted by both controllers and pilots, with both expressing frustration that an important safety 
measure is so often  bypassed.  It is noteworthy  that  a large number  of  the  potential  conflicts of the 
sort discussed occur in the vicinity of navigational fixes - NDBs, VORs, and often ILS outer 
markers. 
Event  1.  Singleengine  aircraft  “A” called Rochester  Departure  Control 
30 miles west of ROC for Stage 111, landing ROC. Aircraft was at 3,000 ft, was 
radared and given current ATIS; pilot stated correct ATIS code. Nonparticipating 
aircraft  within  TRSA,  opposite  direction to  aircraft  “A,” was given as traffic. By the 
time the other aircraft was sighted, evasive action was necessary by both aircraft. 
The  targets merged on  the  scope  and  aircraft  “A” confirmed that  the  other aircraft 
was at the same altitude. Same old story - VFR nonparticipating aircraft in the 
vicinity of a level I11 airport  almost causes  a  midair! 
* * *  
Event  2.  Air  carrier  aircraft “A” was on  departure  climb  out  on  runway  head- 
ing off runway 22. I instructed  the  pilot to remain on runway heading and issued 
traffic, a Stage I11 overflight, as the reason why I couldn’t give him  a  turn  at  that 
time to  join his route  of  flight,  which was northwest  bound.  The  pilot  acknowledged 
the instructions and advised that he had small aircraft traffic ahead and slightly 
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.higher at. 3,000 ft  and requested a turn to avoid it. I had noticed this traffic (a 
primary  target),  aircraft  “B,”  at  about  the  same  time  the  pilot  reported  it. By now 
the Stage I11 traffic was no longer  a  factor  and  the  pilot was  issued  a  right turn to 
320” to intercept the airway. I can only estimate by the pilot’s report that they 
passed within  a  few  hundred  feet  of  each  other.  The  pilot  did  report, “It’s a  good 
thing we turned!” .I advised the local controller, but  the  aircraft was not in radio 
communication  with  the  tower. 
I would like to emphasize that this is not the first time this has happened, 
especially over the LILAC OM as well as the AVON NDB. I feel that possibly the 
lack of  pilot  knowledge on  the  part  of  the  VFR aircraft  was at  fault.  There is a  high 
number of student and low-time pilots using the airport .and refusing to  use the 
Stage I11 service.  I  feel one  of  the  major  reasons  for  an  incident  like  this is the  pilots’ 
not knowing where they are; another is their refusal to  use the Stage I11 service. 
* * *  
Event 3. Burbank  flight  visibility was about 4-5 miles in the  haze  with  the  haze 
tops  at 4,500 and clear above. BUR airport is within TRSA and its ILS runway 7 
approach passes directly  above  the VNY airport  where  the  outer  marker is located. 
Aircraft  “A” was on  an IFR flight  plan on  the  ILS  approach  into BUR just  outside 
the OM about 6.5 n. mi.  from  the  runway 7 threshold,  descending  on  the glide slope 
at about 2,900 ft MSL, in landing configuration with gear and flaps down and all 
three  strobes  and  two  landing lights on.  The  approach was  being  flown  by  the  auto- 
pilot with localizer and glide-slope couplers engaged to  allow more time for scan- 
ning. Aircraft “B” was first seen in the middle of  the  right  side of the  windshield, 
heading  northeast  at  the same or slightly lower  altitude  and  at  a  distance of about 
150  ft. Aircraft “A” immediately overrode autopilot and violently dove to avoid a 
collision. Other  aircraft passed above  and in front  of  aircraft  “A,” missing by  about 
2 5 4 0  ft. No action was ever observed by the pilot of aircraft “B.” All unsecured 
articles in reporter’s aircraft, such as chart books, passenger pillows, were thrown 
about the cabin; no injuries took place. When descent was stabilized, climb power 
was applied and  left climbing turn  instituted  off BUR localizer  after  informing BUR 
Approach  of  the  incident. 
After uneventful landing, aircraft “A” had conversation with BUR tower  and 
approach personnel and was told that at no time did radar operators ever see the 
other aircraft, before or after the near-miss. BUR ATC also informed aircraft “A” 
that  neither  they  nor VNY tower  had ever been in contact  with  the  other  aircraft, 
which was crossing the localizer near the outer marker at exactly the glide-slope 
intercept altitude within the Burbank TRSA and within the Van Nuys Airport 
Traffic Area . . . . I am beginning to  believe that altitude-reporting transponders 
should  be  required  for all operations  in  highdensity  traffic areas such as  TRSAs,  as 
well as in class I  TCAs. 
* * *  
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Event 4. Aircraft  “A” (IFR), 4 miles  east of LOU VOR at  3,500  ft MSL. Air- 
craft “B,” 7 miles east of LOU VOR at 4,800 ft MSL, descending. Aircraft “C” 
(IFR), 5 miles southwest  of LOU VOR at  2,500  ft MSL. Traffic was observed for 
“A” at twelve o’clock, 4 miles, southbound,  just  over  the  LOU VOR. Traffic was 
issued with a  response that  he was not in  sight. The  same  traffic was then issued to 
“Cy’ as ten o’clock, 4 miles, southbound. “Cy’ responded, “Not in sight; keep us 
advised.” The  traffic was no longer  a  factor  for “B” or  for “A.” “C” was then issued 
approach clearance and traffic eleven o’clock, less than a mile, southbound. “C” 
acknowledged the approach clearance and negative traffic in sight. Approximately 
1/2 mile south  of  the  LOU VOR, the  unknown  traffic  and “C” passed. “C” finally 
acknowledged the  traffic in sight and said each  pilot  had to take evasive action. He 
responded,  “That was too close. I want  to  talk  to  you  when I get  down.” I believe 
the reason for  this near-miss was the  fact  that  an  aircraft  that was VFR traversed an 
area  which  is  congested  with  aircraft,  and the  pilot was not talking to anyone  at  the 
approach  control  facility. 
* * *  
Event  5. While vectoring  aircraft  “A” to  left  traffic  for 1 1R at  Tucson Airport, 
I observed  an unidentified  target  proceeding  from west to east  just  off  departure  end 
of Tucson’s runway.  The unverified Mode C altitude  readout  indicated 3,800 ft  MSL 
and climbing.  “A”  had been  told to  descend to  4,000 f t  MSL for  his  left  downwind 
pattern. “A” was out of 4,600 ft descending 5 n. mi.  east  of  the  airport  when  the 
pilot was advised of the unidentified eastbound traffic. As the eastbound target 
approached  “A,”  it  appeared  that “A” was climbing through 4,000 ft  MSL. Pilot  of 
“A” was told to maintain his present altitude (4,400 ft)  and  turn  right - immedi- 
ately - 20”. At  that  time  the  targets were  within  1/2 mile of  each  other  and  (accord- 
ing to  the  readouts)  within  100  ft of each other in altitude.  The  “A”  pilot said that 
he was turning  left to avoid the  unidentified  target.  Tucson  tower advised that  they 
had never talked to  the aircraft  and  that  he  had  apparently  flown  through  the  pat- 
tern  from  southwest to  east  without a  clearance. 
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HUMAN FACTORS IN AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS: KNOWLEDGE O F  THE 
LIMITATIONS OF THE ATC SYSTEM IN CONFLICT AVOIDANCE CAPABILITIES 
Capt. W. P. Monan* 
. . . imprecise adherence to procedures developed through years of exposure to operations in a 
radar  environment. 
NTSB Statement of Probable  Cause, Air Carrier Accident, 1977 
. . . believing the  aircraft to be  at  different  altitudes,  the  approach  controller did not issue a traffic 
advisory alert even though he saw the radar targets of the two aircraft converging on his radar 
scope. 
NTSB Statement of Probable  Cause,  Midair Collision, I978 
Airman  Assumptions  and  Expectations  of  the  Capabilities  of  the ATC System 
Typical  air  carrier  crew  report t o  the  aviation  safety  reporting  System  (ASRS): 
We had a near  midair  climbing out  of XYZ airport. We were on a radar  vector 
in the  TCA,  just  turning  to 090” heading  and leaving 9,500 ft.  Just as  I leveled the 
wings, the flight  engineer called out “traffic  twelve  o’clock!”  I  had to  push  the  yoke 
forward to  miss a  small  red  and white  aircraft. We passed underneath  him by approx- 
imately 200 ft. When we advised the  controller  that we almost  hit a small aircraft, 
he  said,  “Now, I see him. Six o’clock and a  mile.” Why is it  always six  o’clock with 
the close ones? 
On  the  surface,  and as it obviously  appeared to the  reporting  pilot,  this  typical  ASRS  narrative 
apparently indicates  a  radar  controller’s  perceptual  error  which  almost  resulted  in  a  midair  collision. 
No traffic advisories on a converging aircraft had been transmitted; therefore, the controller had 
failed to  do his job  properly. However, routine analysis by ASRS  researchers reveals other  second- 
ary causal factors  associated  with  the  incident.  Semiconcealed in what was not said in  the narrative 
are  pilot  assumptions  and  expectations  that  led  the  flight  crew  “down  the  garden  path”  of wrongful 
anticipation. 
Two cockpit assumptions are apparent: ( 1 )  The air carrier was operating in the tight radar 
security  of TCA airspace and (2) ATC radar  has  the  capability of “painting” all aircraft  targets in 
the air carrier’s flightpath.  These  assumptions would lead logically to  the  expectation  of ‘all perti- 
nent traffic advisories. How this expectation affected outside-the-cockpit scanning vigilance can 
only  be  surmised. 
A quick review of  aeronautical  charts confirms the ceiling of  the  TCA  at XYZ airport, in the 
airspace location where the incident occurred, to be 7,000 ft.  The airliner, out of 9,500, had not 
only  exited  the  terminal airspace but was penetrating  the  congested  TCA  boundary  altitudes used 
frequently - and legally - by nontransponderequipped, light aircraft skirting the control area. 
*Captain Monan, formerly Chief Pilot and Director of Flight Operations for an  international air carrier, is an 
aviation safety  consultant  currently working with the ASRS project’s research team. 
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Furthermore,  the  Airmans  Information Manual  (AIM), corroborated  by  a  substantial  number 
of ASRS reports,  states  that  many  primary  returns  from light aircraft  do  not  display, or paint  only 
faintly,  on  the  controller’s  radarscopes. 
It is very important  for  the  aviation  community to recognize the  fact  that  there 
are limitations to radar service and  that ATC controllers  may  not  be able to issue 
traffic advisories concerning  aircraft  which  are not  under ATC control  and  cannot  be 
seen on radar. 
In  addition,  studies  of  near  midair  conflicts  reported to ASRS at specific  airports  show  that 
most  air  carrier  encounters  with  VFR  traffic  that  occur  just  outside TCA airspace boundaries  are 
not  pointed  out  by  the  radar  controller.  The  controller  may  be  occupied  with  higher  priority  duties 
which  prevent issuance of advisory messages concerning  aircraft not normally  participating  in  the 
air traffic  control  system.  Furthermore, if the  VFR  aircraft  are  not  equipped  with  altitude  reporting 
transponders, the controller would be calling out  numerous  targets  that  might  be  at  altitudes  far 
removed from  the air carrier’s flightpath. 
Thus, in the  final analysis of the  incident,  unwarranted  expectations  of  radar  controller  inter- 
vention  by  the  airman  and  his  lack  of  exact  knowledge  of ATC  system  limitations  apparently  were 
the decisive factors  in  contributing to the  conflict. 
When the judgment of “probable cause” on the conflict occurrence quoted above was ren- 
dered - a decision routinely  made  within  the  province of the ASRS  Program - the airman  reporter 
might have been surprised:  “Lack  of vigilance by  VFR  pilot  and air carrier  flightcrew  during  opera- 
tions  in  a see-and-avoid environment.” 
No air carrier  pilot  could  operate  efficiently  or successfully within U.S. airspace without  antici- 
pation of  many  and diverse ATC procedures,  controller  actions,  and  clearance  communications.  In 
fact,  from  a user’s pragmatic  viewpoint,  the  entire ATC system  functions  as  a series of to-be-fulfilled 
expectancies as to what will occur next. It is when pilot expectations are not fulfilled, or when 
expectations are premised on erroneous or unrealistic concepts, that the first circumstantial links 
for  a  potential midair collision are  formed in the  typical  accident  chain  alignment. 
The ATC system, which is operated and utilized by human beings, is always vulnerable to 
human error. Its capabilities can be limited by equipment malfunctions, saturation, overload, and 
miscoordination. Knowledge of the limitations of the system, and of when and where it is most 
likely to fail or  to display deficiencies or inadequacies,  can serve in  the  early  recognition  and avoid- 
ance  of  potential  midair  conflict  situations. As ASRS statistics  indicate, “Big brother” is not always 
watching.  Furthermore,  he is not always  listening. 
Basic ATC System  Limitations  in Midair Conflict  Avoidance 
In a very broad sense, air carrier midair conflicts, within U.S. airspace, are avoided by con- 
troller  intervention  and  averted  by  pilot evasive actions.  These  two  sets  of  human  actions,  formal- 
ized with prescribed roles,  duties,  and  responsibilities  into  the  twin  concepts  of  radar su veillance or 
the see-and-avoid concept, represent the ultimate capabilities of the ATC system in preventing 
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midair collisions. When operating within a radar environment, these two concepts dovetail into a 
double,  often  overlapping, shield of  protection against traffic  midair  conflicts. 
Inasmuch as the system’s anticollision concepts are composed of human actions, any behav- 
ioral error  or  failure  may  affect  the  system. If both  pilot vigilance and controller monitoring are 
eliminated,  good  luck or the vagaries of  fate  may well determine  the  final  outcome of any converg- 
ing  aircraft  situation. 
This  study  does  not  touch  upon  these  human  factors  per  se;  instead  it deals with  the ATC sys- 
tem as it is limited  by  user  mismanagement  or  by  airman  misunderstanding of its  functional capa- 
bilities. Radar surveillance service may fail for myriad reasons, may be withdrawn in accordance 
with procedural regulations, may even be misled, through ambiguous crew communications, into 
controller belief that  intervention is not needed or  required.  Under  these  circumstances,  the flight- 
crews are usually unaware  that  they  are  operating solely under  the “last chance  filter”  protection  of 
the see-and-avoid concept. 
Although industry debate may rage pro and con over the see-and-avoid concept as being a 
DC-3 procedure used  in  a jet  environment,  any  withdrawal  of  radar  monitoring,  when  unknown to 
the flightcrew, represents a serious operational limitation of the ATC collision avoidance system. 
In  ASRS conflict  reports,  the  occurrence  of even  a minor ATC  “system  error”  often  results  in 
the double hazard of (1) elimination of adequate or timely radar monitoring of the aircraft and 
(2) continued  cockpit  expectation  of  radar  intervention. 
Even without  human  error,  there  are  flight  phases  during which radar surveillance is withdrawn 
without  he  pilot being advised. After  transfer to tower  frequency  during  conduct of visual 
approaches, airmen often apparently continue to anticipate the protection of radar intervention. 
This is a  serious  pilot  misunderstanding  of  standard  ATC  procedures. 
The message “radar service terminated” is frequently  transmitted  in  domestic airspace when  an 
aircraft is cleared for  approach  into  a  nonradar  airport  or  when  en  route  and  departing  from  radar- 
covered areas. Flightcrews in international or overocean  operations  are  accustomed to hearing  the 
final,  meaningful signoff from ATC as the  aircraft  departs U.S. continental  airspace:  “Radar services 
terminated . . . .,, 
There are no  such advisory messages when the ATC radar  monitoring  system fails to intervene 
during  conflict  situations;  thus,  when  radar advisories are  terminated  without  warning,  the  pilot is 
not  alerted to  the need for an extra  measure  of vigilance for  other  traffic. 
Communications- All airman expectations of ATC functions or the fulfillment of those 
expectations  are  channeled  through  the air-ground-air communication  link. In midair  traffic avoid- 
ance, the mutual exchange of information is essential in the implementation and the continuous 
balancing of the  priorities of controller and  crew in the discharge of  their  roles  and  responsibilities. 
The reassuring controller  transmission  of “in radar  contact”  initiates  the  concept of radar surveil- 
lance.  “Traffic at twelve o’clock activates necessary pilot vigilance under see-and-avoid fundamentals. 
These two protective concepts, intertwined by communications throughout the air carrier 
operation,  must survive intact  through  innumerable ATC control  boundaries,  interfacility 
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communication, coordinations, frequency changes, transfers, and sector-to-sector handoffs. Any 
factor  that  delays,  impairs, or breaks  cockpit-controller  communications poses  serious  hazards  that 
can  lead to midair  encounters. 
Unfortunately, oral radio communication &the weakest link in the ATC system. Misunder- 
standing of ATC clearance messages leads to more midair conflicts than any other system opera- 
tional  factor  reported to   the ASRS. 
The ground-to-air link, or “Whaddesay?”: Probably  the  most  frequently  noted cause for clear- 
ance message errors  in  the  cockpit is the lack  of  backup  monitoring  of ATC communications.  The 
distraction of a  crewman  resulting  from  use of the passenger public  address  system,  company  radio 
transmissions,  cabin  service  difficulties,  ATIS  monitoring,  and  myriad  workload  routines  results  in 
the expression  most  frequently  heard in cockpits, “Whaddesay?” 
Whatever the reasons, justifiable or  not, air carrier flightcrews become vulnerable to  serious 
error  when  crew-concept  monitoring is eliminated  from  the ATC communication  loop. When 
clearances  are not read back,  there is no “second  chance”  for  any  misunderstanding to  be  rectified. 
Even when ATC clearances are repeated, ASRS submissions of “system errors” narrate frequent 
controller self-admissions of failure to listen to the  readback. As in the  cockpit,  workload distrac- 
tions  are  the usual reasons  cited  by  controllers  for  lack  of message confirmation. So common is this 
monitoring  failure  that  a  fatalistic cynicism  surfaces in this  report: 
I was busy on  the P.A. system  talking to  the passengers while the F/O took  the 
climb clearance. He read back “17,000” and the controller “rogered” it. Later, we 
were told we had been cleared only to 16,000. On the line we have a saying that 
they’ll  roger anything  they  hear  at  that  facility. 
Such  a  report passes by the  primary  and  enabling  cause:  cockpit  distraction resulting in crew- 
concept failure in communications monitoring. Yet, the pilot’s expectation that the ATC system 
would  catch  the  misunderstood  altitude  readback is the clear tenor  of  the  complaint. 
Communications air-to-ground are not always oral: altitude-encoding transponders emit their 
altitude message continuously to  ground radar. Even aircraft so-equipped may not always be chal- 
lenged for  an  incorrect  altitude  readout.  One airline  pilot operated  a  short-distance  flight leg with  an 
altimeter misset by 1,000  ft. He found his error when he  attempted  an ILS approach  at his arrival 
airport. Although he admitted the initial error, he wondered why radar controllers had not inter- 
cepted his en  route  off-altitude  squawk. 
More difficult to  understand is apparent pilot reluctance and hesitation to request confirma- 
tion or clarification  of  doubtful ATC instructions  or  clearances.  There  are  numerous  airman  reports 
to the ASRS that detail lengthy intracockpit discussions about the exact altitude, heading, DME 
distance, or  direction  of  turn  that  might have been transmitted.  In  some  instances  it  appears  that 
the  more positive or  more aggressive crewmember  pursuades  the  other as to  what was heard. Also, 
there is some  evidence  that suggests that  one  pilot  hesitates to express  lack  of  confidence  in  another 
pilot’s  accuracy or reliability. 
After  takeoff we were dven a  turn  and  changed over to  departure  frequency. I 
questioned the F/O who had said “roger” to the clearance and he said he was 
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positive it was a  left turn. The  weather was not  good  and  I  knew  there was traffic. 
I started  a very  gradual  left  turn. My decision was that if ATC didn’t  say  anything 
right away, I was going to question the left turn. They did, and told me to turn 
right, to 180”. I still don’t  know  if  my  turn was wrong  in the original  clearance or 
my F/O was wrong.  The big lession I  learned  is that  when  workload  has to be  shared, 
you can’t trust  anyone. 
* * *  
We got  mixed up  and confused the 10 DME distance  with  altitude  assignment 
and we busted  our  altitude crossing restriction. I suggest that  pilots  be  told  to  ask 
ATC for  clarification  rather  than  assume  they have  read  adescent  clearance 
correctly. 
The ground-to-air link: “I heard what I expected to hear”: Behind  every  psychological strength 
is the  shadow  of  its  weakness; in airman  human  factor  performance,  long  experience over  a  sched- 
uled  route  system  may  lead to  an  exaggerated  assurance of  anticipated ATC clearances,  restrictions, 
or messages. The  greater  the  experience,  the  stronger will be the pilot’s expectation  that  the  depar- 
ture will be via the same  “canned” flight plan,  taxiied to  the usually  used runway, assigned to the 
usual initial altitude over familiar fixes, and cleared to climb to and maintain usual flight levels. 
This psychological element  results in one  of  the  more  frequently used sentences in ASRS air- 
man  reports: “I heard  what I expected  to  hear.” 
I had  flown  this  route  many  times previously and as I recall  previous  clearances 
had  been  “cross  point XYZ at 8,000 or below.” It  was this  same  clearance  for  many 
years.  Probably I was mentally  programmed  for  a  similar  clearance  and  accepted  the 
F/O’s departure  from  the  clearance. 
The  setting,  prior to takeoff,  of  an  altitude  select  to  an  anticipated  ATC  altitude assignment is 
an  obvious  temptation to  routeexperienced  airmen.  It also  leads to  a  continuing series of “altitude 
busts” in air carrier operations. Several serious route excursions were narrated by pilots who had 
failed to  catch  an  unanticipated  change  in  their flight plans as issued by clearance delivery. Often 
these  incidents were  associated  with cockpit  workload  distractions. 
When anticipated ATC clearance for descent has been delayed, or if the aircraft is “stepped 
down”  in slow increments, air  carrier  crews  are  especially  “spring-loaded” to  hear  what  they  expect 
to  hear. An ATC clearance to  an aircraft with a similar call sign plus overexpectation combine to  
produce a hazardous communication mixup. Abbreviated “roger” responses or other ambiguous 
transmissions  reinforce  controller belief that  the  correct  aircraft  has received the  descent  clearance. 
Anticipation  of  ground  controller  clearance  to cross  adjoining  parallel or intersecting  runways 
is involved in the afterlanding, rollout phase of operations. The workload distraction is high: one 
pilot is normally giving total attention to aircraft handling, reversing or unreversing, speed and 
brakes. Rain, fog, or wet runways require added concentration. Instructions such as “Hold short 
o f .  . .” may  not register during  such  concentrated high-load  work  cycles. 
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The air-to-ground link: Apparent  cockpit  reluctance  to  request  clarification  or  confirmation  of 
ATC clearances and ATC instructions  carries  over  into  communication  exchanges  during  potential 
conflict situations. The most prevalent indication of such hesitation is failure to advise the  radar 
controller if a converging target point-out has been definitely sighted or if the initial sighting has % 
been lost. Ambiguous responses often mislead the controller into believing that traffic has been 
sighted. A “traffic at twelve o’clock” advisory answered by a crisp “roger” permits considerable 
controller  latitude kassuming  that   the “roger”  affirmed  the sighting rather  than  mere  receipt  of 
the message. 
The verbal projection of an assured, self-sufficient command image may be a psychological 
block to airing  a message that  might  connote  doubt,  puzzlement,  or  need  of assistance  in  handling 
any in-flight situation.  The airman’s basic reluctance to  transmit in-flight problems to  ATC facilities 
appears to  be substantiated by the latest statistics in the annual report of the Air Force Rescue 
Coordination Center. In 1978, there were 700 ATC alerts or requests for ATC assistance in the 
handling of in-flight emergencies or  malfunctions; 5 17  of  those  came  from  military  aircraft.  The 
report concluded that both general aviation and commercial crews were hesitant in alerting FAA 
controllers to any need for priority traffic handling or  standby crash equipment  for  their arrival. 
The airline command  role is a delicate  and sensitive human  factor  in  the  rat-a-tat,  fast moving 
interaction of ATC functioning with pilot responsibilities. ASRS reports include angry confronta- 
tions (“I’ll fly my airplane  and you fly your desk . . . .”) when  pilots believe that  controllers  have 
encroached  upon  their  in-flight  authority. However, verbal portrayal  of  total self-sufficiency  which 
effectively  eliminates  radar controller  intervention is an  unnecessary  self-imposed limitation to  the 
ATC conflict  avoidance  system. 
The  cockpit voice recorder  (CVR)  and  the ATC tapes  of  the  San Diego  midair  collision  appear 
to illustrate  communication  characteristics  common  to  numerous ASRS conflict  incidents.  Accord- 
ing to  NTSB testimony,  the air carrier  crew  apparently  had  lost  sight  of the small  aircraft  that  had 
been previously pointed  out  by  radar. In  response to  the tower’s advisory “traffic  at twelve  o’clock, 
1 mile,”  the  pilot  replied:  “Okay, we had it there a minute ago.” And later, “I think he’s pass(ed) 
us  off to  the  right.”  Yet,  the CVR showed  that  the crew continued to  discuss among themselves the 
possible location of the  aircraft. When the  conflict  alert warning sounded,  the  approach  controller 
did not  inform  the  tower, because he believed the airliner  crew  had the light  aircraft in sight. 
In addition to ambiguous responses, use of nonstandard phraseology may lead to misunder- 
standings of conflict-sighting communications. The softer vowel sounds may slide into similar 
sounding  words. For  example,  one  controller  reported  that  he  thought  the  pilot said “in contact”; 
however,  tapes  made it clear that  he  had said “no  contact.” As a consequence,  an  aircraft  making a 
practice instrument approach had to  take violent evasive action when a second aircraft lifted off 
during  an  intersecting  runway  takeoff. 
Perhaps no pilot transmission is more phonetically emphatic and more understandable than 
the word “negative.” Direct, immediate, and unequivocal cockpit responses to radar traffic advis- 
ories  would  reinforce  a  need for  the  controller’s  intervention  during  conflict  situations. 
Conflict avoidance  limitations of the  ATC  system associated with visual approaches- One  of 
the  more  routine  air  carrier  pilot  expectations is receipt  of  an  approach  controller’s  transmission: 
“Cleared for a visual approach,  change  over to  tower  frequency . . . .,, 
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I. 
Although airmen, through faulty communication techniques, may inadvertently “wire out” 
the  protection  of  radar surveillance, the visual approach  clearance  procedurally  removes the radar 
backup to the see-and-avoid concept. 
There are strong  inferences  in  ASRS  reports  that  many  airline  pilots  expect  continued  radar 
separation service, traffic advisories, and  radar  intervention  throughout  the  approach.  This is a false 
expectation.  The  current AIM states  it  succinctly.  The  radar  controller “provides radar  separation 
until the pilot accepts a visual approach clearance . . . and continues flight following and traffic 
information until the aircraft is instructed to contact the tower.” The pilot’s role during visual 
approach is to  “be aware that  radar service is automatically  terminated  without advising the  pilot 
when  the  aircraft is instructed  to  contact  the  tower.” 
Explicit wording such as this emphasizes crew responsibility for definite and correct sighting 
of  pertinent  traffic as pointed  out  by  radar  prior  to  tower  transfer. 
At  approximately  15 miles out  and 6,000 ft ,  we reported  the  airport  in sight. 
Approach  Control cleared us  for  a visual to 17L and  moments  later  they said “Traf- 
fic at twelve  o’clock,  5  miles,  contact  the  tower! 
We contacted the tower. There was no further mention of traffic. While in a 
shallow turn  onto  final, I observed a light airplane less than  a mile and closing. We 
pushed over to avoid collision. We estimated miss by 200 ft  horizontally and 50 ft  
vertically. Time from observation to evasive action approximately 2 to 5 seconds. 
Many ASRS narratives of converging targets involve absence of any  pilot  requests  for  imme- 
diate  radar  intervention  when  targeted  traffic  had  not  been  sighted. 
I gave traffic several times to the air carrier. Not sighted. When the airliner 
turned base, the  two targets  merged.  I  instructed  him to change  over to  the  tower. 
His reply was, “That  aircraft we just missed  was at 3,400 ft.” His Mode C was read- 
ing 3,400 when the targets  merged. 
Air camer flightcrews  may  believe, erroneously,  that  their filed IFR flight  plans will automati- 
cally trigger radar vectoring around radar point-outs of VFR aircraft targets. Controllers have no 
authority  to  offer  such  vectoring services voluntarily. 
When requested  by  the  pilot, issue radar  vectors to  assist in avoiding the 
Controller Handbook (7110.65B) p .  85. 
traffic . . . 
Furthermore,  there  should be no airman  expectation of controller  response if the  flightcrew 
reports  that  VFR  traffic  has  not  been  sighted. 
If the  pilot  informs  you  that  he  does  not see the  traffic  you have  issued,  inform 
ControIler Handbook (711 0.65B) p.  85. 
him  when the traffic is no longer  a  factor. 
After transfer to tower frequency, loss of the initial sighting becomes a critical element in 
many  midair  events: 
We were  cleared for a visual approach to maintain  2,500  until clear of a  light 
aircraft. We had the traffic and descended. After we turned, the light aircraft was 
not in sight; we assumed he was inbound to  the opposite  side  of  the  field. As we 
turned  final,  at  2,000  ft, we saw the small  aircraft  directly  underneath us. We were 
about 400 ft over  him. 
As  a probable  aftermath  of  the  San  Diego-midair, several ASRS  reports  reflect air  carrier  crew 
unease in accepting  a  controller  transmission that  “The  other  aircraft  has  you  in  sight,  change  over 
to tower  frequency.” 
When converging aircraft are working different VHF frequencies, the loss of visual sighting 
becomes  more  hazardous.  An  outbound air  carrier  crew  who  had  been advised by  Departure  Control 
that  an  approaching  aircraft  had  them in sight reported as  follows: 
The  best I  can recall of  the  traffic advisory is “Inbound  aircraft at  one o’clock, 
2 miles, out of  5,500.  He has you  in sight.” Just as I was rolling the wings level out 
of a turn, I saw the  traffic converging on us. I leveled off;  he  kept converging and 
descending at us. I descended, trying to maintain visual separation, and finally 
stopped at 3,700 ft. At that point the controller told us we were clear of traffic. 
Pilot  expectation  that  the  tower  facility will continue  the  approach  control’s  radar service is 
evidenced in this  report: 
We had  been  turned  over to  tower.  Tower cleared us for a visual to  runway  12. 
At  1,500  ft,  upon  rolling  out  of  our  turn, I saw another  aircraft  exactly  at  our alti- 
tude and about 150 yards away. He  was  in  an extremely nose-high attitude as 
though  he was trying to avoid us. I immediately  descended  and the aircraft passed 
directly over us. Upon talking to the controller, I was advised that the tower had 
no  radar, was not in  radio  contact  with  the  other  aircraft,  and  did  not  know of his 
presence in the  area. 
Although  some  tower facilities  have alphanumeric  displays  and  others have  BRITE or  ARTS I, 
11, or  I11 installations,  conduct  of  radar surveillance is not a required ATC function  during visual 
approaches.  In  fact,  the  total  absence  of  tower  radar  capabilities  does  not  merit  out-of-house publi- 
cation  of  the  locations  of  such  nonradar  tower facilities. 
During IFR  weather  approaches,  airmen  should  be  aware  that  at  airports  with  towers  that  are 
not  radarequipped, IFR departures  may  be released until  the  inbound  pilot  reports over the  outer 
marker to  the  tower.  Any  failure  or  delay  in  making  the  frequency  change  or  marker p ssage during 
the  approach  may  set  up a  takeoff-landing  conflict on  the active runway. 
Although the procedural ATC limitation of automatic termination of radar service during 
visual approaches is  clearly  emphasized in FAA publications, the elimination of  the service without 
advising the  pilot  appears to disregard the  human  factor  element. 
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Without  a  routine  and  constant  oral  reminder to  the pilot  that  radar services  are  being  termi- 
nated, ATC system reliance upon a written procedure seems unrealistic. Such trust in human 
behavior is further weakened by  the  knowledge  that AIM publications,  certain  portions  of which 
may  be highlighted in  some fight operations  manuals,  are  not  required  “booky7  knowledge  by  the 
typical air carrier  flight  standards  departments. The issuance  of  Federal Air Regulations as entire 
chapters in  Flight  Operations  Manuals  does not provide for  immediate  retrievability or  ready assim- 
ilation in a  busy  cockpit. 
In  the same manner  that  the controller’s  transmission  “in radar  contact” eases cockpit  atmo- 
sphere, so the phrase  “radar  services terminated”  might well  trigger  increased pilot vigilance  during 
visual approach operations. Omission of the termination phrase probably reduces frequency con- 
gestion  within  terminal  airspace;  however, as a  procedural  compromise,  it  may  contribute to  unwar- 
ranted  airman  expectations  of  radar  intervention at a  time  when no  intervention should  be 
anticipated. 
In minor  misunderstanding  of ATC functions, several  air  carrier reports  complain  of  approach 
controller practices in clearing them for visual approaches. “We are always asked to report the 
field  in  sight  and  when we do we are  then given a visual approach to  the  airport.” AIM states as a 
duty of the controller: “Issues visual approach clearance  when the pilot reports sighting ‘the 
airport . . . .” 
The risk of midair  conflicts  during  a visual approach may  vary  considerably  according to  the 
physical location  of  the  airport  and  the ATC terminal  airspace  configuration  in  which the  airport is 
situated. The proximity of busy general aviation fields associated with non-TCA controls at air 
carrier  terminals  can  increase  significantly  the  hazard  of  legal  VFR  aircraft  crossing  through or near 
the  approach lanes. 
Approach  Control cleared us for  a visual approach to runway  34R. I contacted 
the  tower  just  prior  to  turning base leg and we were cleared to  land. My F/O was 
flying  and as we made our  turn I spotted  a small  aircraft  heading  toward us at  the 
same  altitude.  It  happened so fast  that no evasive action was taken.  I  don’t  think  the 
other  pilot saw us; he passed behind  us  by  about 200 to 300 ft. Apparently  neither 
the  tower  nor  Approach  Control was aware  of the  other aircraft’s  presence. 
Conflict avoidance limitations of the  ATC  system associated with airspace configuration and 
airport runway  layouts- With regard to potential  midair  conflicts,  each  category  of ATC terminal 
control has its own peculiar limitations, whether TCA, TRSA,  or non-Stage I11 airspace. Airport 
runway layouts, especially parallel and intersecting patterns, also contribute to many air carrier 
traffic  incidents. 
Airmen must have a realistic appreciation of these airspace-airport problem areas in order  to 
correlate  their see-and-avoid vigilance with  ATC  limitations in providing  radar  surveillance  service. 
Probably the highest pilot expectation of allencompassing radar security occurs within TCA air- 
space. This human factor probably explains, in some measure, the chagrin and indignation often 
expressed in ASRS reports involving  conflicts  associated  with TCA controls. 
TCA boundary lines are meaningful: they have  been  planned to provide  maximum  security  for 
air carriers and other suitably equipped aircraft within the controlled airspace and for flexible, 
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self-channeling of  VFR  aircraft outside the airspace. TCA boundary lines outline very specific ATC 
limitations: aircraft entering and exiting TCA airspace are not  only passing through transient air- 
craft  altitudes heavily congested  with  traffic but are  encountering  nontransponder  equipped,  non- 
communicating VFR light aircraft which are often unseen or unnoticed by the radar controller. 
We were approaching the XYZ VOR, heading 1 10” and level at 1 1,000. We 
were cleared after  overhead to turn  to 130” and  descend to 6,000. Over the VOR, 
turning right and leaving  1 1,000, I was  busy  resetting  my  heading  cursor  when S/O 
yelled “Look  out!” I looked up to see  a  light  aircraft go  by  our  left wing tip,  about 
100-150 ft  away. No time to do  anything.  Approach  Control  did  not have the air- 
craft  on  radar. Why, I do  not  know. 
“DO not expect all traffic to be pointed out,” is stated in AIM. TCA boundary areas, expe- 
cially the over-TCA-ceiling altitudes, are operational limits which should be well known to air 
carrier  pilots. 
As an “additional service,” VFR traffic point-outs to air carrier crews may or may not be 
issued. 
You have complete discretion for determining if you are able to  provide or 
continue to  provide a service in a particular case. Your reason not to provide or 
continue  to  provide a service in a particular case is not  subject  to  question  by  the 
pilot  and  need not  be  made  known  to  him. 
Con troller Handbook (71 IO. 65B) p .  85. 
Occasionally, unauthorized aircraft penetrate the TCA radar “fences.” Although these inci- 
dents can be attributed usually to inexperience or unfamiliarity, there are a number of ASRS 
reports that indicate that some VFR pilots choose “not to play the ATC game”: too many com- 
munications, too much  delay,  often  vectors  not on  the  direct  line  of  flight  from  “A” to “B,” even 
the possibility of holding,  which is anathema to  some  VFR  airmen. 
The presence of these ATC system nonparticipants helps to explain controller reports that 
relate to  near midair conflicts, followed immediately’ by the sudden appearance of a VFR trans- 
ponder  squawk  on  the  radarscope. Many of these  “unknown  VFR  traffic”  aircraft  are  identified as 
twinengine  models in the air  carrier  crew sightings. 
In non-TCA terminal airspace, no boundary limits apply except the 5-mile radius, 3,000 f t  
cylinder  of  the  airport  traffic  area.  It is during  approaches to  these  airports  that  pilots  can  anticipate 
“legal” encounters  anywhere  in  the  vectoring  area,  including  the  ILS  localizer courses. 
In airport layout design, the use of parallel runways - in the interest of faster traffic han- 
dling - provides  a  physical  situation  that is ready to link  with  any  pilot  or  controller  error to cause 
an  incident. When parallel runways  are  immediately  adjacent,  any  groundcockpit  communication 
misunderstanding of clearances  regarding  use  of  left-right  runways  becomes  highly  significant. 
At  the larger terminals,  use  of parallel runways  for  simultaneous  departures  can  create  conflict 
opportunities. A faster  aircraft  may  overtake  a  slower  one,  a  leading  aircraft  may  abruptly  turn on 
course into the path of a following departure, an aircraft may slowdrift in heading into the 
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adjoining lane. Frequently, a pilot’s delay in initiating takeoff roll throws off the controller’s 
timing. 
If  both  aircraft  have been cleared over to Departure  Control,  the wait is long;  it  seems  longer 
still if the  radar  targets  are merging  and neither  pilot  has  come up  on frequency. 
The  two  aircraft were 3 miles offshore  before  the first one came  up  on  Depar- 
ture  Control. By that  time  the  targets  had  merged. We had no  way to communicate 
with  them. 
* * *  
Visual separation  had  been  applied but  both  aircraft  climbed  into  the  overcast 
and  tower visual sighting was lost.  Both  aircraft were late  coming  up  on  Departure 
frequency;  they were on converging  courses before  communications were 
established. 
Conflict  avoidance  limitations of  the ATC System:  ‘Systenz Errors”- Air camer airmen are 
usually aware,  often  acutely  aware,  of  their  own  behavioral  mistakes o r  omissions in the  cockpit.  It 
is reassuring to read straightforward  admissions of personal  “goofs”  in ASRS reports:  professional- 
ism requires such self-honesty for growth. Furthermore, such reports provide to ASRS the study 
material  for  the  human  factor esearch that is so urgently  needed  in the aviation  field. 
However,  in  conflict  avoidance  situations, ATC functioning is vulnerable to failure  from  two 
sets  of  human  factor  limitations:  the  pilot user and the  controller  operator  of  the  system.  Although 
the majority of controller reports to the ASRS are as frank and open as the airmen reports of 
omissions or  self-fault, the  somewhat  euphemistic  terms  of  “system  deviation’’  and  “system  error” 
are invariably used in narrating  the causal factors  of  a  conflict  incident.  System  error is as frequent 
and as potent a factor as cockpit blunder in the primary or contributing causes of midair near- 
collisions. 
In blunter language, a system error during a conflict situation, as reported to the ASRS, 
usually is associated with  one of four general categories  of ATC problems: (1) a  controlIer  “forgot” 
about an aircraft, (2) a  controller failed to  monitor progress of  a  flight  adequately, (3) interfacility 
or  intrafacility  miscoordination,  or (4) malfunction  or  breakdown  of ATC radar  equipment. 
The potential in such human or electronic failures is the elimination or critical lapsing of a 
radar controller’s surveillance of two targets on collision or near-collision projected flightpaths. 
After the hand-off to approach control we observed the targets merge with 
both  aircraft having  checked  in at 4,000 ft. 
* * *  
The  radar  computer failed and  the  two  aircraft  targets  disappeared leaving no 
means to  separate  them.  Broadband  radar was initiated  just  as  the  two  radar  targets 
merged. 
* * *  
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At  approximately 20252 my  attention  was  drawn to the radarscope. I saw two 
targets  together,  one  indicating level FL290,  the  other  data  block  reading  290N240. 
I did not  know  until  later  that  the  second  aircraft was in  fact  at  FL290. 
* * *  
As I sat  down  at  the  table, I saw two  targets merging on  the  radar . . . . 
Furthermore,  the  absence  of surveillance protection  may  be  unknown to the airmen involved 
in the impending conflict. Supposedly secure in a radar environment, they are actually operating 
solely under  the see-and-avoid concept. 
Although radar controller misperceptions usually have direct cause and effect relationships 
with traffic conflicts, intrafacility and interfacility miscoordinations often reflect errors or omis- 
sions committed in adjoining sectors, at different control facilities and in previous time periods. 
ATC controllers  “own”  their individual  airspace. As an  air  carrier passes through  the ATC structure, 
its progress must be coordinated  through a multitude of controller  actions,  frequency changes, con- 
trol transfers, pointouts, and radar handoffs. During an intrafacility or  interfacility coordination 
failure, it is often  not  only  the  pilots  but also the receiving controller  who is usually “left in the 
dark” concerning significant traffic. As a result, he is unaware that intervention may be urgently 
required. 
One  such  sector-to-sector  misunderstanding was reported  concerning  a  handoff  of  an  aircraft 
which was not  equipped  with a transponder  and  which was operating over  a very congested  airway. 
The  controller  had  been advised that 5,000 ft was the assigned altitude, whereas the  pilot  actually 
had  been given 6,000 ft  and was flying at 6,000 ft. Without  apprehension or  concern,  the  radar  con- 
troller observed numerous  opposite  direction  targets  at 6,000 ft passing close by  the  aircraft.  The 
pilot  then  called,  requesting a different  altitude  because “so many  aircraft seem to be  coming  right 
at  me, all at my altitude.” 
I asked his altitude  and when he said “6,000” I was stunned. I told him to turn 
90” immediately  and  descend to  5,000 ft.  There was head-on  traffic at 6,000 ft  only 
3 miles away. 
ASRS files include  typical  system  deviation  or  system  error  categories  as  the following: 
1 .  Incomplete traffic briefing of relief controller: ‘‘I don’t know. I just sat down at the 
table . . . .” 
2. Controller  training  activity:  “The  trainee seemed to have settled  down  somewhat;  when  he 
cleared the aircraft for immediate takeoff it caught me by surprise. By the time I rechecked the 
position  of  the  other  aircraft, it was too  late . . . .” “Before I could cut in . . . .” 
3. Over-stress: “I was working combined positions for the high and low sectors and traffic 
was heavy.” 
4. Workload distraction: “I had  an  aircraft on an  emergency. When I looked again, the  targets 
were  merging . . . .” 
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5. External  intemptions: “Two or  more  people  were  walking  constantly  back  and  forth  and 
they  partially  blocked  my view . . . .” 
6. System malfunction: “The computer failed and it took us a long time to  set up manual 
operation.  In  the  meantime,  four  aircraft  were  not  controlled . . . .” 
7.  System  saturation:  “Thunderstorm  activity . . . I had  aircraft  diverting all over  the 
place . . . .” 
8.  Coordination breakdowns: “My hand-off man forgot to  . . . .” “I forgot to  advise , . . . 5, 
“The  ground  controller cleared  an  aircraft  across the active but . . . .” 
There are many categories of facility control system errors, but it is not  the  purpose  of  this 
study to enumerate ATC failures.  Human  behavior factors  are  noted  only as significant ATC system 
limitations  that  may  result in failure  of  the  radar surveillance concept  at  any  time,  at  any  altitude, 
or  in any airspace. 
“Big Brother” is often  looking  elsewhere. 
When the air carrier was about 17 miles northwest the conflict alert began 
blinking. A quick check showed an inbound aircraft converging with the airliner. 
I called the  approach  controller;  he was not  working  the  inbound  (he  should have 
been).  I  then called the  center  controller.  For  some  reason  the  center  had  lost  track 
of  the  inbound. 
* * *  
The  two  aircraft,  one  climbing,  one  descending, were on collision  course. It was 
impossible to  attain radio communication with either aircraft in time to  separate 
them. 
* * *  
The two aircraft were 15 miles apart, head-on, when I noticed the conflict. I 
told  Approach  Control  to  stop  one  aircraft  at 9,000. Approach  Control said he was 
between  frequencies  and  had  been given the  wrong  sector  frequency.  The  second air- 
craft was at 10,000. I told him to  turn  immediately  and  climb to 12,000. The  first 
aircraft  had  gone  back to  Approach  Control  for  another  frequency.  This  time  they 
gave him the  correct  frequency  and  he  came up, reporting  out  of 9,600 ft. At  that 
time, the first aircraft was out of 10,300. Thirty seconds later, they were clear. 
Conflict avoidance  limitations of  the  ATCsystem: radar equipment  limitations- Although  the 
capabilities of primary radar to depict weather are not diminished during full automation mode 
operation (radar data processing - RDP), nevertheless the controller’s actual display of precipita- 
tion is far  different  from  that  expected  by  the  typical  airman.  To  the  pilots  on  a “red eye”  midnight 
special, dodging around  cumulonimbus  thunderheads, it often  must  appear  that  the  ground  radar- 
scope is a giant screen that paints far more efficient contours than their own diminuitive tube. 
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“Why did I have to argue with the controller about deviation?” asks one pilot. “He should have 
seen  our  need.” 
During RDP operations (usually 20 hours a day), the controller does not see actual targets; 
instead,  he views a computer-generated  electronically  reproduced  picture  in  the  form of digitized 
information. Weather precipitation  returns  are  filtered  through  two  preset levels of intensity.  The 
lower threshold setting eliminates presentation of any light precipitation; the upper threshold 
depicts  contour  lines  with heavy echo  densities.  The  radar  operator  can  lighten  the  intensity  or c m- 
pletely  eliminate the  contour-line  weather  presentation  in  order to improve his tracking of aircraft 
targets  through  the  precipitation  returns. 
During broadband operation (during nonautomatied mode), circular polarization cancels out 
returns from spherical objects, such as raindrops. Vertical motion, however, permits recapture of 
elongated  patterns.  “Circular  polarization,”  states the AIM, “will eliminate  some  weather  returns.” 
Individual  aircraft  deviation  around  clouds  seldom causes a  conflict  situation,  but  a widespread 
belt  of  turbulent  cold-front diversions, if permitted  or  performed  without  authorization, can over- 
load  the  capabilities  of ATC’s separation  controls. 
At times, without malfunctioning, radar targets may disappear from coniroller scopes. For 
example, aircraft in the “main bang” (overhead transmitter sites) are temporarily lost from the 
radar display. If radar separation is being provided, aircraft are normally vectored around the 
antennae area. The moving target indicator (MTI) has a designed idiosyncrasy in erasing targets 
synchronized  at  its  speed. “Blind Speed” is the  apt ATC descriptor  for  this  radar  limitation. 
These  system deficiencies are  minor  elements  in  avoidance surveillance, however,  when  set into 
context  with  the large number  of ASRS reports  that involve inability  or  failure to  depict  light air- 
craft  targets  prior to a  conflict. As AIM points  out:  The  amount of reflective “skin”  surface  of  an 
aircraft will determine  the size of  the  radar  return.  Ground  clutter and temperature inversions may 
obscure weak primary targets; relatively slow motion increases the time requirements for initial 
target recognition. Under the best conditions, a small, light airplane will be more difficult to see 
than a large commercial jet. 
Controller difficulty in sighting the primary blip of a small aircraft, without a transponder, 
against a  background  of  alphanumeric  block  readouts of air carrier  jet  returns  probably  constitutes 
the  most  important  and  most  misunderstood  limitation of the ATC system.  It is a  circumstance  that 
not only negates the radar surveillance-controller intervention concept but one that also can link 
simultaneously with airman human factors in concealing the immediate urgency of see-and-avoid 
evasiveness. 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
In  the  anticipation  that  airplanes will not always  function  as designed, air carrier  airmen  spend 
considerable  training  time  in the  study  of  in-flight  recognition  and  handling  of  aircraft  system mal- 
functions  and  failures.  Despite  the  fact  that  controllers also train to handle  malfunctions  and  abnor- 
malities  in the ATC system,  the  majority  of  controller  reports to the ASRS  are, in  a  broad sense, 
“logbook”  entries  of  malfunctions  and  failures  of  the  system.  The  primary causes of  the  problems 
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are usually human behavior factors, but the errors invariably result in temporary deficiencies or 
lapses in  what  might  be called “ n o ~ ” l ”  ATC operation  in U.S. airspace. 
The  impetus  for  this  study derived from  the  surprise  reported  by so many  professional  airmen 
in  their  individual  encounters  with  “abnormal” ATC operation  during  conflict-avoidance  situations. 
Routine  expectation  of  radar surveillance often  apparently  produced  an  exaggerated  dependency  on 
controller intervention; there was minimum consideration of possible service interruptions or of 
breakdowns  within  the  monitoring service. The  adequacy  of  the see-and-avoid responsibility  in over- 
coming the deficiencies  of the  radar surveillance concept  may  be  questionable  and  debatable  (“more 
a  hope  than  a  method,”  states  one  airman)  but  the  present  ongoing  realities  of  the  operating  limita- 
tions  of  the ATC system  should  be  recognized  and  anticipated. 
Drawing from  the  narrative  contents of many  hundreds of ASRS reports,  this  study  attempts 
to highlight certain areas of  air  carrier  operations  during  which ATC radar services may  fail, may  be 
withdrawn,  or  may  be misled into passive target observation. During trafficconverging situations, 
when controller intervention is anticipated but is not implemented, the pilots of the converging 
aircraft  are  thrust  unknowingly  and  unexpectedly  into  the final evasive phase  of the see-and-avoid 
response. 
Probably more important as a midair conflict causal link than any other limitation is the 
apparent  inability  (or  difficulty) of the  radar  controller  to sight and  point  out  numerous  light air- 
craft  that  are  not  equipped  with  transponders,  and  to  do so soon  enough to permit early avoidance 
of potentially conflicting aircraft. This deficiency is most frequently cited during TCA boundary 
area  conflicts  and  during  initial  approach  maneuvering into non-TCA airports. 
Two-way communication - immediate, direct, and unequivocal - is the air-ground-air link 
that  activates  and  coordinates  airman  and  controller  responses in the avoidance  of  traffic  conflicts. 
When communication messages are absent,  misunderstood  or  incorrect,  the  protective  concepts  of 
the ATC  system  are seriously weakened or rendered  inoperative. 
Faulty  intracockpit  management  in  the  validation  of ATC  clearances or  instructions  often is a 
primary  factor.  Controller  failures to  monitor  readbacks  may  permit  a  potential  conflict o develop 
into an actual physical incident. During the.conduct  of visual approaches,  ambiguous  or misleading 
cockpit messages may blur controller understanding that pertinent traffic has been sighted or 
definitely  identified. 
Perhaps symbolically as well as realistically, the following airman narrative sums up all the 
essential conflict-avoidance  elements  in the adequacies  and  limitations of the ATC system. 
Climbing out  of XYZ airport we were given traffic, twelve o’clock. We asked 
for  vectors  around  the  traffic.  The  controller  said,  “Unable.” We asked, “Why not?” 
The  controller  said: “It’s too  late.” 
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ALERT BULLETINS 
Introduction 
During the  report analysis process, ASRS staff members frequently recognize situations  that 
require prompt attention in the interest of increased aviation safety. Through the Alert Bulletin 
medium,  it is often possible to  call these  problems to  the  attention  of  those  in  the  best  position  to 
effect  a change if a  problem  does  exist. As in  earlier  Quarterly Reports,  a sample of Alert  Bulletins 
is  presented  here,  with  the  responses  they  have  called  up. The examples  that follow  are  grouped by 
general  category to aid  readers  with  particular  interests. 
Air Navigation 
1. Text of  AB:  Connellsville,  PA,  Connellsville  Airport: Reporting  aircraft flight  crewmember 
describes apparent faulty operation of the Connellsville nondirectional beacon; during a recent 
flight  usable ADF signals were not received until  the  aircraft was 12 miles  from the  airport,  at which 
time a strong signal was received but provided highly erroneous bearing information. Reporter 
states  that evidence  of  corrosion  exists at  the  beacon  antenna  site,  that  maintenance is performed 
infrequently,  and  that  the  situation described is frequently  encountered  during  periods of precipita- 
tion. He also reports that other pilots have reported this condition, which can be hazardous to 
flight in view of the  mountainous  terrain in the Connellsville  area. 
Text  of  FAA  Response:  The  subject facility was thoroughly evaluated by an AEA-400 FAA 
Inspector and flight-tested by an FAA flight inspection aircraft June 19 and May 2, respectively. 
The results  of the  evaluation revealed no facility  deficiencies to  support  the allegation  contained  in 
the Alert  Bulletin. 
* * *  
2. Text of AB: Mt. Vernon, OH, Knox  County  Regional  Airport:  Pilot  reporter  points  out  an 
apparent cartographic error on the Detroit Sectional Aeronautical Chart, on which Knox County 
Airport  appears to be  incorrectly  located.  The  Appleton  VORTAC  radial to  the  airport as shown on 
instrument  approach  charts is correct,  but  does  not agree with  that  plotted on the  sectional  chart, 
on which  incorrect  coordinates  have  been used for  the  airport  location. 
Text of FAA Response: The location of facilities and features on VFR Aeronautical Charts 
are not necessarily the  exact  position,  and  no  attempt  should  be  made  to  obtain precise bearings 
and  distances  from  them. 
There  are several  reasons  why  facilities  might be slightly  off location.  The first is unintentional 
and is due to the difficulty of registering the different colors to  each other during the printing 
process. This is considered no problem  even  when  registration is off by as much  as  a  half  mile as 
long as the  features  are in the  proper  relationship to  each  other.  The  second  reason is intentional 
and  is  done  for  clarity.  Due to  the size  of the  symbols,  adjacent  features, if precisely located,  could 
overlap each other  making  it  difficult  or impossible to read. To improve readability in congested 
areas, features  are displaced but  proper  relationship  maintained. 
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The displacement  of  Knox  County  Airport  is due to registration;  however,  consideration will 
be given to shift  the  symbol slightly  west to bring it  closer to  the radial,  as  shown on  the IAP  Chart. 
Airports:  Facilities  and  Maintenance 
3. Text  of AB: San  Francisco,  CA,  San  Francisco  International  Airport:  Citing  numerous  pilot 
reports and ATIS broadcast sequences calling attention to  poor  aircraft  braking  response  on  run- 
way 19L during  wet  weather,  a  pilot  reporter  asserts  that  the  southerly  portion  of 19L between  its 
intersection with runway 28R and the runway 1R threshold is extremely slippery when wet. He 
contends  that  a rejected takeoff  with  the  runway  wet,  with  no  overrun available,  could  have  serious 
consequences,  and  recommends  that  immediate  steps  be  taken to correct  the  situation  cited. 
Reporter  proposes  that,  in  the  event  that  alleviation is not possible,  runway 19L  be closed to traffic 
in wet weather even though  this  action might  result in temporary  cessation  of  airport  operations. 
Text  of  FAA  Response:  Our  coordination  with  San  Francisco Airport’s Engineering Division 
confirms  the following: 
1.  The bid opening for the grooving on runway 1 R-19L is being held today, April 6, 1979. 
2.  Award of  the grooving contract will be made  by  April  24. 
3.  The grooving  work is to commence  by the middle  of May coincident  with  the  intersection 
overlay  work of runways 1 R-19L and 1 OL-28R. 
4. The grooving of the critical portion of runway 1R should  be  completed  by  the  middle of 
June  1979. 
* * *  
4. Text of AB: Indianapolis, IN, Indianapolis International Airport: A reporting controller 
states that the latest (January 25, 1979) issue of United States Government (NOAA) Instrument 
Approach Procedures, as well as commercial charts which utilize NOAA data, are substantially 
inaccurate in their  depiction  of  taxiways  at  Indianapolis  International  Airport  and  that  this  condi- 
tion is confusing to controllers and pilots. Reporter contends that taxiways that no longer exist 
continue to be  shown,  that  newer  taxiways  do  not  appear,  and  that  charted  designations  are  incor- 
rect.  He alleges that  this  condition has  been repoded  to NOAA by  airport  management and  ATC, 
but those reports have not been acknowledged. The reporter contends that the lack of accurate 
chart  information is potentially  hazardous. 
Text  of FAA Response: We were  informed  today  by  the  Acting  Chief,  Instrument  Approach 
Procedure (IAP) Chart Branch, NOS, that the corrected information will be reflected in the IAP 
dated May 17,-  1979. He also stated  that  the  information was sent  by AAT-435 on March 20, which 
was too  late  for  the March 22  cutoff  date  for an  earlier  revision  and  publication. 
* * *  
5. Text  of AB: Knoxville, TN, McGhee-Tyson Airport: A controller  reports  that  radio  trans- 
missions from McGhee-Tyson tower on tower and approach control frequencies are seriously 
degraded to the  extent  that  many messages must  be  repeated  and  are  often  misunderstood or missed 
altogether. Reporter considers the condition hazardous to flight operations and contends that it 
increases controller  workload  and causes  distraction.  He  notes that extensive construction since the 
original  locating of the antenna  sites,  low  antennae  height,  and  reduced  power  output all contribute 
to reception  blind  spots  in  certain  areas  and to the  poor  reception generally of  radio transmissions; 
he  recommends  that a  new  transmission site, utilizing equipment  presently available at  the facility, 
be  constructed. 
Text  of FAA Response: The  Southern Regional  Office,  Airway  Facilities Division, is  not  aware 
of  communications  problems at  Knoxville,  Tennessee, McGhee-Tyson Airport. However, the  exten- 
sive construction  noted  in  the  Alert Bulletin has forced the  FAA to seek a new communications 
site.  They  estimate that a  new  site will be in  operation  by  approximately  January  1980. 
* * *  
6. Text of AB: St. Louis, MO, Lambert Field Airport: Over a period of time, reports have 
indicated poor aircraft braking and steering response after landing on runway 12R at Lambert 
Field  during  wet  weather.  Hydroplaning is suspected,  and  a  reporter suggests that runway grooving 
might alleviate the problem. 
Text  of FAA Response:  Runway 12R is scheduled to be grooved this  summer. With regard to 
St. Louis Airport,  the enclosed memo  from  the ALPA Regional Safety  Chairman is forwarded for 
your  information. 
Airports:  Lighting  and  Approach  Aids 
7. Text  of AB:  A  pilot reports  that  at Beverly, MA Airport (BVY) the  inbound course of  the 
SDF approach for runway 16 has a bend which results in runway offset at a critical point  in  the 
approach.  Corrective  action is requested;  bend is serious enough  to have caused missed approaches. 
Text  of  FAA Response: The Beverly, MA Airport (BVY) SDF was inspected on August 14, 
1978, because  of the user complaint  cited  in ASRS AB-78-38. The  bend  mentioned was found  by 
the flight inspection crew on aircraft N-84; however, it was within the tolerances specified in the 
United States  Standard Flight  Inspection Manual. 
It may  be significant to  note  that  the BVY SDF is offset  which, if the  pilot was not aware of 
the  offset,  might  tend to make  the  bend seem  exaggerated. 
* * *  
8. Text of AB: Huntsville, AL, Madison County Jetport: Pilot taxiing east on taxiway J at  
night  followed blue lights  which turned  south  and led  him to an  unimproved  dirt  surface  instead  of 
to taxiway G farther  east. He recommends  that misleading.lights be  extinguished. 
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Text  of FAA Response:  September  18,  1978. Airport manager  reports  by  telephone  that  the 
two  blue  taxiway  lights  on  the  short  taxiway to an  unpaved  area  have  been  extinguished;  the  two 
red  taxiway lights just  beyond  these  extinguished  lights will remain  in  operation. 
* * *  
9. Text of AB: Hyannis, MA, Barnstable Municipal Airport: A recent report states that  the 
VASI  lights  for  runway 6 at  this  airport have  been out of service since  February  1978.  The  reporter 
indicates that the VASI glide-slope guidance on this runway is needed because of buildings and 
other obstructions in proximity to the final approach path; the report suggests that the VASI 
should be restored to operation as soon as possible. 
Text of FAA Response: The facility cited in the subject report is a non-FAA facility and 
maintained by the Airport Authority. While the facility was not  out  of service for the length of 
time  cited  in  the  report,  it was out  of service intermittently  through  the  period  and  continues  to  be 
unreliable to the  present  time.  Local FAA personnel  are  consulting  with  the  Airport  Authority  in 
an attempt to improve  its  reliability. 
* * *  
10. Text of AB: Norfolk, VA, Norfolk International Airport: A controller reports that a 
recent  failure  of  commercial  electric  power deprived Norfolk  TRACON of all radar  and  radio  com- 
munication capability and caused loss of airport runway lighting. The failure was compounded 
when  a  backup  commercial  power  source  remained unavailable because  of  a  faulty  switching  mecha- 
nism. Battery-powered transceivers were available in the  tower,  but  not  in  the  radar  room.  Reporter 
contends that, lacking radar and radar-room communication capability, with no runway lighting, 
and with only limited tower radio communication possible, a hazardous separation'problem was 
avoided only  because  existing  air  traffic  volume  was  untypically  light.  Reporter suggests that  undue 
reliance is being placed upon  a  demonstrably  unreliable  source  of  emergency  power. 
Text of  FAA  Response:  The  problem  with loss of  commercial  electric  power  at  the  Norfolk 
TRACON appears to have  been the cause in  two  different  sources: 
1.  A loss of power  at  the  tower  and TRACON  itself  would cause a loss in the  communications 
and  radar  data  capability. As indicated,  there is a  backup  battery  source  for  communications  but 
not  for  the  radar service. At  Norfolk  a  backup  engine  generator at  the  tower is scheduled  for  instal- 
lation in June, 1979. With installation of this generator the TRACON will be provided backup 
power  for  the  radar  and  radio  communications. 
2. The second power failure source in the report relates to the runway lighting, which is a 
responsibility of the airport sponsor. Normally, these systems are without backup standby power 
and  would  require traffic to proceed to its  alternate if runway  lighting is lost  during  the  time  it is 
required. 
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Air Traffic  Control:  Facilities  and  Procedures 
1 1. Text of AB: Aurora, IL, Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center: Controller reports 
have been received which indicate that a serious problem may exist with the ZAU radar site at 
Hanna  City,  IL. The  reports allege that  when  aircraft pass over the  antenna  site,  the  computer  drops 
the  track,  and  the  data  block  becomes  erratic,  in  some cases reversing course.  The  reporters  contend 
that as a  consequence  of  this  condition,  controllers  are  frequently  faced  with  a  critical  problem of 
maintaining  radar  identification  while  reverting to broadband  radar  for  traffic  separation. 
Text of FAA Response: The problem stated in the subject document resulted from aircraft 
flying  above  20,000 f t  within 8 miles of the  site  responding to over-the-antenna  interrogations.  An 
improved beacon omniantenna and a modified STC curve have been installed which correct the 
problem. 
* * *  
12.  Text of AB: Miami, FL,  Opa  Locka  Airport:  A  recent  report  states  that  a  radio  blind  spot 
exists  on  the  primary  tower  frequency  at  the  end  of  the  approach to runway  27R  at  this  airport.  To 
resolve the  communications  problem  between  the  tower  and  aircraft  positioned  or  holding  on  .the 
ground at  runway  27R,  a  Gonset  radio is used. Allegedly, numerous  occasions  occur  where  a  landing 
aircraft and one cleared for takeoff require rapid adjustments to preclude a potential conflict, 
attesting to  the unreliable  and  unsatisfactory  communications.  A previous report  cited  the  inability 
of the  tower  to  override  pilot  transmissions  and also noted  the  lack of  a  guard channel. 
Text of FAA Response: The subject bulletin describes a situation at  the Opa Locka Airport 
whereby  there was a  radio blind spot  for  the  tower  frequency  on  runway  27. An investigation  of  the 
problem  resulted  in the  changeout of some relays and  an  antenna.  To  date  there have  been no  more 
complaints of the problem at Opa Locka Airport. The reported situation is considered corrected. 
* * *  
13. Text of AB:  Providence,  RI,  Providence  Green  State  Airport:  A  pilot  report  notes  that  the 
ATIS recorded transmissions from this facility are frequently difficult to understand because of 
enunciation and diction problems. Reporter considers that safety of flight may be compromised 
through  misunderstanding  and  by  the  attention-diverting necessity to monitor  the  broadcast  infor- 
mation  repeatedly  in  order to receive usable  data. He recommends  that  personnel  recording ATIS 
messages be reminded of the vital importance of clarity and intelligibility in their radi.0 trans- 
missions. 
Text of  FAA  Response:  Providence  tower has issued a  notice  that  outlines  corrective  action  to 
be taken by supervisors to improve the Airport Terminal Information Service (ATIS) operation. 
This includes a review of Order 7210.3DY paragraph 1351.b, a playback requirement, and a tape 
monitoring  problem. 
Additional followup action requesting periodic pilot reports of ATIS readability should pre- 
clude  any  future  problems. 
* * *  
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14. Text of AB: Longview, TX, Gregg County Airport: It has been reported that the ASR 
Approach  Procedure  (for  runways  13/31  and  4/22) at  Gregg County  Airport specifies the  runway 
threshold as the missed approach point and that controllers are to continue providing heading 
guidance  for  inbound  aircraft t o  this  point. A reporting  controller  considers  this  procedure 
hazardous, as accuracy  limitations  inherent  in ASR equipment  permit misalignments  of aircraft  with 
the  runway  centerline  by as much as 500 ft  to  one side  or  the  other.  Reporter also states  that  pilots 
continuing a radar-guided approach until past the airport boundary are denied adequate time to 
effect the necessary transition  from  instruments to  visual  flight. The  report  notes  that since  pilots 
are  restricted  from  descent  below  minimum  descent  altitude  before  establishing visual contact  with 
the runway, there appears to be no advantage in continuing radar guidance beyond this point. 
Reporter suggests that MAP should  be  redesignated as a  point 1 mile  from the  end  of  the  runway. 
Text of  FAA  Response: The suggestion to redesignate the surveillance radar  approach missed 
approach  point (MAP) to  1 mile from  the  end of the runway at Gregg County  Airport, Longview, 
Texas,  is not  accepted.  The suggestion  is  also not  acceptable  for  national  application.  The  rationale 
that  the MAP at  the  runway  threshold is  dangerous  because of azimuth  inaccuracies  in surveillance 
radar  does  not  consider  the  protection provided by  pilot  application  of  FAR  91.1  17(b) (1) and  (2). 
Location  of  the MAP at  the  runway  threshold provides many users  a  significant operational advan- 
tage  in that  they  can safely  make normal  approaches to  the runways  of  intended  landing  from  the 
minimum descent altitude at the threshold. This is particularly true in the case of the 10,000-ft 
runway 13-3 1 at Gregg County  Airport. 
Historically  this  practice  has  proven  safe and  effective  for  the  aviation  community. No benefits 
will be  gained from changing it. 
Hazards to  Flight 
15. Text  of AB:  Caledonia,  OH,  Gist  Elevator  Landing  Strip:  An  ASRS  report  notes  that  Gist 
Elevator  Landing  Strip  is  a  designated  parachute  jumping  area,  underlying  airway  V493.  Reporter 
feels that, although the area is listed in appropriate publications and properly symbolized on the 
Detroit  Sectional  Aeronautical  Chart,  safety  would be enhanced if the  parachute  symbol were  also 
to  appear  on  the  low-altitude  en  route  charts used  in  lieu  of  sectionals by many  VFR  pilots. 
Text  of  FAA Response: Parachute  jumping areas are  charted  on  Sectional  Charts in  accordance 
with  a  criterion based on usage. All jumping’areas, regardless  of  usage, are  or will be  published  in  the 
appropriate  Airport/Facility  Directory,  indicating  whether  the area is charted  or  not.  Granted,  some 
users use the  Enroute  Charts  for  VFR  flying,  but  they  should use these  charts  in  addition  to,  not 
in lieu of,  the  Sectionals. 
There are many VFR features on Sectional Charts that are not on the Enroute Charts. To 
single out  and  indiscriminately  add selected parachute  jumping areas to  Enroute  Charts would not 
enhance  safety,  but  could be a  disservice, giving and encouraging the  VFR  pilot to conclude  that  the 
Enroute  Charts  are also  designed for  VFR flight. 
With the endorsement of the Defense Mapping Agency and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association, we strongly  advise  against  adding  parachute  jumping  areas to  the  Enroute Charts. 
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16.  Text  of AB: Hayward, CA, Hayward Air Terminal Airport:  A  pilot  reports  that  military 
helicopters  utilize  a  taxiway  adjacent  to  runway  28L  at  this  airport to practice hovering  maneuvers. 
The reporter contends that whenever there is a left crosswind the rotor wash drifts across the 
runway, creating a serious control problem for landing aircraft. One report alleges that ATCT 
controllers  do  not move the  helicopter  to  another  location  until  after  they have received a com- 
plaint  from  a  pilot.  The  reporter suggests that  waiting  for  a  pilot  complaint  may  be  too  late if the 
first  exposure to  the  condition  results  in  an  accident  or  incident. 
Text of FAA  Response:  The  helicopter  hover  test  area  at Hayward Airport will be  relocated 
in the very  near future  to resolve the  potential  problem of rotor wash across  an active runway. 
* * *  
17.  Text of AB: Various  locations:  Three  recent  pilot  reports uggest that  the  increasing  popu- 
larity  of  powered  hand-glider  flying  may  indicate an emerging  hazard to air  traffic. An air carrier 
pilot  reports  a  near miss while descending through  3,500  ft  on  downwind  for  landing at  Raleigh/ 
Durham (RDU). He flew between hang gliders estimated to be 1,000 ft apart, without time for 
evasive action. In a second reported instance, the pilot took action to avert a potential collision 
with  a  hang glider at  1,800  ft,  beneath  the  floor f St.  Louis  (STL) TCA. The  third  report  mentions 
powered hang-glider flights within the Honolulu (HNL) Airport traffic area. The three reporters 
recommend  some  form of  flight  and  airspace  training  for  pilots  of  powered  hang gliders and  that  the 
pilots be required to hold some type of FAA Airman Certificate. Lack of radio communication 
capability  and of radar  reflectivity  of  the gliders are also mentioned  as  contributing to  the  potential 
hazards  inherent  in  the  present  unregulated  conduct  of  powered hang-glider  flights. 
Text of  FAA  Response:  The  Federal  Aviation  Administration  (FAA)  has  been  monitoring  the 
continued growth of hang-gliding activity for several years. Because of the low cost and relative 
simplicity of operation, hang gliding became an active sport in the early part of the 1970s. In 
recognition of  this  growth,  the  FAA  developed  and  published  an  advisory  circular  suggesting  safety 
parameters  and  precautions  for  hang liders. 
As we approach  the 1 9 8 0 ~ ~  it  has  become evident  that  certain  regulatory  actions are  necessary 
with regard to hang-&der operations  in  the  national  airspace  system. 
A  regulatory  project  has been authorized  by  the Air Traffic Service to issue a  notice of pro- 
posed  rulemaking  for  public  comment  before  the  end  of  this  year.  The  proposal will amend  Federal 
Aviation Regulation Part 101 to include hang-glider operations. If adopted, this amendment will 
define  the  operational  areas  in  which  hang liders may  participate.  This will be  a  major  step  forward 
correcting  the  difficulties  outlined in Alert  Bulletin  79:86. 
Ames  Research  Center 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration 
Moffett  Field,  California  94035, April 2, 1980 
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